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Abstract
Incoherence arguments are intended to demonstrate that some philo-
sophical position should be rejected because it is fatally flawed. I review
the kinds of fatal flaws targeted in incoherence arguments, and argue that
such arguments are not conclusive against the position they target, but
merely pose challenges that require greater imagination. Furthermore, I
claim that apparently incoherent positions have an instrumental value in
expanding the intellectual resources of philosophy.
I have become increasingly suspicious of incoherence arguments – those ar-
guments that purport to demonstrate that a particular philosophical position or
theory should be rejected because it is ultimately incoherent in some way. I am
not convinced that any incoherence argument demonstrates that an apparently
incoherent position should be rejected. I suspect that such arguments merely
pose challenges to be solved with regard to the position. It is the nature of those
challenges that lead me to suspect that there is a peculiar instrumental value
in apparently incoherent positions. In short, I propose not only that apparently
incoherent positions should not be rejected on the grounds of their putative inco-
herence, but that such positions should become the focus of increased research,
since they represent opportunities for philosophy to expand.
The target of the charge of incoherence in these arguments is certain philo-
sophical positions or theories, rather than speech, behavior or beliefs, which are
also sometimes considered to be incoherent. If incoherence is supposed to be
a fatal flaw in a theory, then coherence would seem to be a general virtue of
theories, and it is important at the beginning of this discussion to consider why
it should be a virtue. The root meaning of the word ‘coherence’ expresses a
quality of sticking together. Why should this stickiness be a virtue? I think
the virtue lies in the sense of unity that coherence implies, as suggested by G.
F. Stout in an early response to the coherence theory of truth: “Coherence as
a test of truth rests (1) on the Law of Contradiction, and (2) on the Unity of
the Universe” (Stout 1908, pp. 30-31). Since the universe as a unified whole
seems to hold together, so should any adequate theory purporting to describe
or explain that universe or any part thereof, and according to Stout, one way
that theories stick together is by avoiding contradictions. So coherence as a
virtue represents the unity both in the subject matter to be explained and in
the theory that explains it. It would seem in a sense that a theory that does
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not stick together and therefore flies apart is ultimately not a theory at all, at
least after it has fallen apart.
Of course, British Idealists such as Harold Joachim to whom Stout was
responding made it clear that mere logical consistency or validity was not suf-
ficient for the kind of coherence that they considered vital to the nature of
truth (Joachim 1906, pp. 73-75). As F. H. Bradley argued, truth requires both
coherence and comprehensiveness (Bradley 1914, pp. 202-203, 214). However,
the notion of coherence that figures into incoherence arguments need not be
strong enough to establish truth according to some formulation of a coherence
theory of truth. It would certainly be a strong virtue of a theory that it be a
true theory, but not all false theories are thereby incoherent, so the kind of co-
herence needed to demonstrate the coherence of theories need not be the same
as the the kind of coherence in the coherence theory of truth. It appears to
be some weaker notion of coherence that incoherent positions lack, such that
incoherence arguments seek to establish not only that those positions are false,
but also that they are not even candidates for truth since the positions cannot
hold themselves together.
I think there are two conceptions of coherence upon which incoherence argu-
ments typically rely: (1) argumentative consistency, and (2) systematicity. My
claim for these two rests on the basis of an examination of various conceptions
of coherence that figure in philosophical arguments, and a determination of
which of these conceptions yield sufficiently feasible conceptions of incoherence
by their negations that could conceivably support a rejection of an apparently
incoherent position by means of an incoherence argument. Some conceptions
merely indicate that the argument for a position is inadequate or incomplete, for
example, not that a position cannot hold itself together. I omit this preparatory
study here in the interest of avoiding tedium.
Consider first the conception of incoherence as a failure of argumentative
consistency. This conception is linked strongly to the notion of self-refutation.
If a coherent position is one that supports a consistent argument on its behalf,
an incoherent position would be one that refutes itself. Indeed the charge of
self-refutation often features strongly in incoherence arguments. Although the
notion of self-refutation seems to represent an insuperable obstacle to the estab-
lishment of a viable philosophical position, I nevertheless have doubts concerning
whether such self-refutation arguments ultimately succeed.
John Passmore identifies three kinds of self-refutation: absolute, pragmatic,
and ad hominem. Ignoring the last kind, which is directed against individual
people, rather than positions or accounts, there remain two ways to show that
a position refutes itself: “Formally, the proposition p is absolutely self-refuting,
if to assert p is equivalent to asserting both p and not-p” (Passmore 1961,
p. 61). Pragmatic self-refutation occurs when “. . . somebody has put forward
a thesis while at the same time apparently engaging in a procedure which,
according to his thesis, is impossible, e.g. he appears to speak the words ‘I
cannot speak’” (1961, p. 80). Furthermore, John Mackie has provided a formal
analysis of these kinds of self-refutation, showing how the refutation can be
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logically demonstrated and identifying the formal conditions under which each
kind of self-refutation applies (Mackie 1964). Given these analyses and others
that have followed them, it might seem that there are no grounds for doubting
the success of incoherence arguments based upon self-refutation. Nevertheless,
I do indeed have doubts.
Passmore’s account of absolute self-refutation, like Stout’s conception of co-
herence, rests upon the principle of non-contradiction. The appearance of inter-
nal contradictions within a philosophical position may indeed be an unwelcome
discovery. However, it seems that at least some philosophical positions accused
of being incoherent deliberately countenance the kind of contradictions that
characterize absolute self-refutation according to Passmore. Contradictions in
these cases are not awkward, unwelcome consequences of a poorly considered
position. Rather, the contradictions are precisely part of what is being claimed
in the position. To hold contradictions to be fatal to these sorts of philosophical
positions would seem to beg the question against them.
With regard to Mackie’s formal analysis, comparable considerations apply.
Mackie’s formal analysis relies upon classical formal logic. So if the results of
this analysis are applied to philosophical positions that explicitly reject classical
logic, positions that might advocate intuitionist or relevance logics, for exam-
ple, the claim of self-refutation would thus seem to beg the question, since the
claim of self-refutation is based upon logic that the position explicitly rejects.
Interpretive charity requires imputing to a position interpretations according to
which most of its statements come out true, including interpretations of the logic
according to which the position operates. Even if a position does not explicitly
reject classical logic, it might be shown later that the position would seem more
viable under an alternative, non-classical logic. Furthermore, even if an existing
non-classical logic is not available according to which a philosophical position
might seem sensible, it may be the case that a new logic might later be devised
to make sense of the position.
These considerations point to one reason for suspicion of incoherence argu-
ments. If an incoherence argument proceeds on the basis of a classical logical
analysis, for example, but there is an existing non-classical logic that makes
sense of the position that is the target of such an argument, then it seems to
me that the fault lies with the failure of the incoherence argument to apply
existing resources to the problem, not with the apparently incoherent position.
Suppose however that no existing system of logic was available to make sense of
an apparently incoherent position. In this case the incoherence argument would
appear to be justified. Yet what if a new system of logic were developed later ac-
cording to which the apparently incoherent position would not seem incoherent
at all? I suggest that in this case, the problem lies with the lack of imagina-
tive resources deployed in the incoherence argument, the lack of imagination to
devise an adequate system of logic that could make the apparently incoherent
position seem more coherent, not with the apparently incoherent position itself.
It would be premature to claim at this point that these suspicions apply to
all incoherence arguments, that they all represent a failure of imagination, since
the previous considerations apply primarily to what Passmore calls absolute self-
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refutation and to a formal analysis of pragmatic self-refutation. There are other
approaches to pragmatic self-refutation that do not rely specifically upon purely
logical considerations that must be considered. I think two general strategies
for demonstrating pragmatic self-refutation can be identified: (1) the position
undermines its own foundations, and (2) the position fails to meet its own
standards.
As an example of a position undermining its own foundations, consider a re-
ductio ad absurdum argument against relativism offered by Harvey Siegel, who
notes that according to radical relativism, there is no neutral framework for the-
ory evaluation. Yet if relativism is correct, then there must be some justification
for the position and therefore some neutral framework according to which it can
be judged to be correct. So if relativism is correct, the means by which it can be
established as being correct effectively undermine the foundations of relativism
itself, and therefore “relativism of the sort we have been considering collapses
into incoherence” (Siegel 1984, p. 367).
One problem with this argument as given and with arguments of this sort
in general, it seems to me, is establishing precisely what is to count as foun-
dational in any given philosophical position. I have already appealed earlier to
interpretive charity in attributing a logical system to a position. The applica-
tion of interpretive charity in this case would require that if a position seems
incoherent on the attribution of a certain foundational claim, then perhaps that
apparently foundational claim should not be attributed to the position. If rela-
tivism seems incoherent on the assumption that there is no neutral framework
for theory evaluation, then interpretive charity would suggest that relativism
may not require this assumption. Perhaps some particular proponent of rel-
ativism may explicitly have made such an assumption, but the incoherence
argument would then merely address this careless assumption on the part of
one individual, not necessarily the tenability of relativism itself. The problem
then becomes how to understand a form of relativism, even radical relativism,
in which there might indeed be a neutral framework of theory evaluation. The
incoherence argument does not examine this possibility, but merely accepts the
problematic assumption as given.
Another problem lies in working out the consequences of the position, as-
suming that the foundational assumptions are correct. If relativism does indeed
require there to be no neutral framework for theory evaluation, then does the
assertion of the correctness of relativism really require such a neutral frame-
work? It would appear so if correctness is understood in an absolute sense, but
a proponent of radical relativism would not accept a conception of correctness in
this absolute sense. Interpretive charity would thus appear to require the rejec-
tion of the understanding of correctness as absolute correctness. The problem
then becomes how to understand how a position can be only relatively correct
in some meaningful way. Again, the incoherence argument just stated does not
examine this possibility, but merely accepts the problematic understanding of
correctness.
Both problems point to a common pattern according to which incoherence
arguments of this form rely on certain assumptions that are not further explored,
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where the position in question might be understood to be coherent upon further
exploration. However, there are indeed stronger self-refutation arguments than
the one I cited from Siegel that attempt to close this gap by posing destructive
dilemmas for a philosophical position. According to this pattern of argument,
either the position under evaluation accepts one alternative or another, but
either alternative leads to incoherence. Therefore, the position is incoherent.
Indeed, Siegel himself has already presented such a stronger destructive dilemma
against relativism in an earlier argument than the one previously cited. Stated
briefly, the argument is as follows: “In short, to defend relativism is to defend
it nonrelativistically, which is to give it up; to ‘defend’ it relativistically is not
to defend it at all” (Siegel 1968, p. 231).
Yet here too I think the same kinds of problems resurface. Perhaps there
are ways of understanding the position such that one or more alternatives are
viable, ways that the argument does not consider. Perhaps the assumption that
the alternatives are exhaustive is mistaken, and that there is some other al-
ternative according to which the position is coherent. Even if the dilemma is
framed in terms of a direct contradiction, such as that either relativism requires
neutral frameworks or it does not, further distinctions may show that there is
an alternative understanding of the position that may require neutral frame-
works in some sense and not in another, or a relativistic defense of relativism
in one sense and not in another. The incoherence argument only works when
such alternatives are no longer explored, and the deployment of an incoherence
argument seems to indicate the limits of imagination in failing to identify such
alternatives, not necessarily the absolute failure of the apparently incoherent
position. So again, an incoherence argument seems to pose a challenge, but it
is not clear that such arguments always demonstrate that the challenge cannot
be met.
The other strategy for demonstrating pragmatic self-refutation that I noted
earlier is to show that a position fails to meet its own standards. This pat-
tern might be seen as a species of the previous strategy of undermining the
foundations of a position, where the foundations in question are not necessar-
ily substantive assumptions, but epistemic standards that the position applies.
Perhaps the most notorious instance of this strategy is the argument against
logical positivism, which relies upon the principle of verifiability to determine
the meaningfulness of statements. Someone eventually noted that the positivist
statement asserting the principle of verifiability was not verifiable according to
any formulation presented by logical positivism and therefore was meaningless
according to its own standards.
More importantly for a discussion of incoherence, consider an example from
J. M. Fritzman in an article entitled “Against Coherence” in which he argues
that the coherence theory of justification is incoherent. Briefly, he states his
argument as follows: “Coherentism claims that it is impossible to criticize,
evaluate, or justify beliefs from a perspective external to the belief set. Not
only is it possible to adopt an external point of view, but it is also necessary.
Since coherentism denies this, it is incoherent” (Fritzman 1992, p. 186). One
reason that Fritzman gives for the necessity of an external point of view is that
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the evaluation of beliefs occurs at a metalinguistic level, which is by definition
outside of the level of the linguistic system that it discusses (1992, p. 187).
This strategy for demonstrating incoherence may seem more secure than
the strategy of showing that a position undermines its own foundational as-
sumptions, at least insofar as a position explicitly outlines the standards that
it applies. Of course, if those standards are merely extrapolated by whomever
deploys the incoherence argument as being inherent in the position criticized,
then there is a question whether that position truly entails those standards used
against it in the argument. Again, interpretive charity would suggest that if the
extrapolated standards lead to incoherence, then perhaps those standards should
not properly be attributed to the position. Yet even if a position explicitly states
the standards that it demands and that are not met by the position itself, it is
not clear whether the position has merely been formulated carelessly, or whether
the position is simply untenable under any formulation. What emerges from the
incoherence argument is a challenge to reformulate the apparently incoherent
position. The apparent failure of a position to meet its own standards may
pose a more difficult challenge than that posed by the apparent undermining
of a position’s own foundations. For example, Fritzman’s argument seems to
pose the challenge of formulating a coherence theory of justification that spans
metalinguistic levels. Yet it is not clear to me that the incoherence argument
demonstrates that the problem cannot be solved. Rather, the argument seems
to take the very existence of the problem itself to be conclusive against the
target position.
For these reasons, incoherence arguments by self-refutation seem suspicious
to me, since the positions they target appear to pose challenging philosophi-
cal problems to be solved, but the incoherence arguments merely take those
problems to be fatal to the position, rather than exploring ways to meet those
challenges. In this context, consider the argument of Michael Stack against
certain self-refutation arguments, in particular, arguments that claim that a
position is false because it argues on the basis of something that the position
itself rejects. One example that he gives is the case of the skeptic who denies
rational belief. As the self-refutation argument typically proceeds, if the skeptic
fails to argue for his position, then he can safely be ignored, but if he argues
for his position, he relies on the possibility of rational justification for beliefs
and therefore refutes himself (Stack 1983, p. 328). Stack notes that most self-
refutation arguments of this sort are deployed to preserve traditional doctrines,
such as the intuition that there is knowledge and justification. His claim is
that tradition-preserving arguments on the basis of self-refutation misconstrue
positions that challenge traditional doctrines by failing to recognize that the
arguments that seem to refute themselves in this way are in fact reductio ad
absurdum arguments against the traditional positions. If the skeptic argues for
his position, it is because he aims to convince someone who does accept rational
argument as valid, and if rational argument can be used effectively to challenge
rational argument, then the problem would seem to lie with rational argument,
not with skepticism. Once the problems with rational argument are noted by
means of the argument, the skeptic can discard the argument for skepticism and
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its presumption of the validity of rational argumentation, as in Sextus Empiri-
cus’ metaphor of the ladder that is discarded once it is used to ascend (Sextus
Empiricus, 2005, p. 183).
Stack’s suspicions concerning self-refutation arguments align very well with
mine against incoherence arguments. Tradition tends both to constrain imag-
ination as well as enable it. Imagination seems to require a pre-existing stock
of images, concepts, and ideas as a source on which to operate. The various
techniques of imagination operate by playing with, modifying, and even flatly
denying existing ideas, as described by Nelson Goodman as ways of worldmak-
ing (1978, pp. 7-17), for example, rather than producing new ideas from the
void. Yet that very tradition can also constrain imagination when those ideas
become so entrenched that some thinkers refuse even to suppose that the ideas
could possibly be denied coherently. It seems to me that a blunt refusal to play
with certain ideas lies at the heart of incoherence arguments in general.
I think the question of philosophical imagination likewise underlies suspicions
concerning the second conception of incoherence, namely lack of systematicity.
The conception of coherence involved in this case seems to derive from Hegel
through the British Idealists, for whom the notion of a system was vitally impor-
tant. If a position is so disorganized or is dependent on such a fragile foundation
that no system can even be assembled, then it would indeed appear to be an
incoherent position. The problem is not that the system falls apart, but that it
cannot even come together in the first place, which would certainly be a serious
criticism of a position.
I think a good example of this kind of incoherence argument can be found
notably in Richard Fumerton’s article “The Incoherence of Coherence Theories”.
Fumerton points out two conceptual regresses faced by the coherence theory of
truth. The first concerns the relata of coherence, namely what must cohere
with what. According to Fumerton, what makes a proposition true according
to coherentism is that it coheres with a set of propositions that is believed. Yet
what makes it true that this set of propositions is believed? Presumably that it
coheres with some other set of propositions that is believed, and so forth, falling
into a regress (Fumerton 1994, p. 94). The second regress concerns the facts
about the coherence relations themselves that hold between propositions. What
makes the propositions about the coherence relations true? Presumably it will
be their coherence with other propositions. Yet there are propositions about this
new coherence relation that will likewise be true on the basis of other coherence
relations, and so forth (1994, p. 96). These conceptual regresses indicate that a
coherence theory of truth cannot even get off the ground, that it cannot properly
be systematized in order to provide an explanatory account of truth.
Of course, incoherence of this sort is properly directed against any possible
systematization of a position, not merely a particular actual systematization. If
one proposed systematization fails, that failure by itself does not show that all
systematizations must fail. Yet here again I think the same basic considerations
about failure of imagination apply as those noted with regard to self-refutation.
The charge of incoherence by failure of systematicity can be refuted most ef-
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fectively by producing a system. For example, with regard to another kind of
argument, the core of the argument for intelligent design is that certain living
species are irreducibly complex, meaning that they are too complex for the pro-
cess of natural selection to explain them. In my terms, the claim seems to be
that certain species cannot be explained by any system of natural forces that
does not include intentionality of design. The response from evolutionary biolo-
gists is that they already have such an explanatory system, but that proponents
of intelligent design neither bother to learn the system in its entirety nor to
understand the evidence for that system.
With regard to incoherence arguments in philosophy, I think the most no-
table recent example of a challenge to a charge of failure of systematicity is
Graham Priest’s dialethic logic (Priest 2006). Because the principle of non-
contradiction is so firmly embedded in human thought, it has been thought
incoherent to deny the principle, particularly in such a way as to suggest that
there might be true contradictions. This incoherence would seem to be grounded
in a failure of systematicity, according to which it might be thought that no sys-
tem that allowed that there might be true contradictions could even get off the
ground, let alone hold together, since contradictions are precisely the sort of
thing that tear systems apart, as suggested by Stout’s comment cited earlier.
Priest’s response is to produce such a system and to show how it can hold to-
gether. Regardless of what one might think of Priest’s arguments for his claims
that specific contradictions hold true in the world, I think the formulation of
his dialethic system shows that the idea is not completely incoherent, where
incoherence is understood as failure of systematicity, and where the charge of
incoherence seems ultimately grounded in an inability to imagine or to under-
stand a dialethic system.
With regard to Fumerton’s argument, then, there seems to be inherent in
his argument a challenge to provide a system for the coherence theory of truth,
one that can be formulated in such a way as to avoid the kinds of regresses
that he points out. Though Fumerton claims that the first kind of regress is
effective against any formulation of the coherence theory of truth (1994, pp. 95-
96), I am not convinced. It may be effective against coherence theories of
truth that make the same assumptions that Fumerton makes in his analysis,
particularly the assumption that a coherence theory must talk about the relata
of coherence (1994, p. 96), but I am not certain that there can be no formulation
of a coherence theory of truth on different assumptions that still counts as a
coherence theory of truth.
What Fumerton’s argument seems to rely on is a foundationalist pattern of
reasoning, though not necessarily an explicit foundationalist theory of truth.
The pattern is that the coherence of any single proposition is established on
the basis of something else that is already established. With this assumed
pattern of argument, Fumerton’s conceptual regresses may seem compelling.
However, the problem with this assumption seems to me to be that a coherence
theory of truth should properly reject this foundationalist pattern of reasoning
in favor of a more consonant holistic pattern. The truth or coherence of any
single proposition is not separately established on the basis of something already
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established, but rather, every true proposition is established as coherent together
and at once. The systematicity of coherentism would be established by the
existence of a set of propositions that is a coherent set, according to some
operative conception of coherence. So the coherence theory need not eventually
address coherence in terms of relata, as a relational property held between
individual propositions and something else, as Fumerton claims, but rather,
coherence should be understood as a property of an entire set of propositions.
There may be an epistemic or practical problem in how to identify such a set,
a problem that Nicholas Rescher attempts to address (Rescher 1973), but it is
not clear that there is a metaphysical problem with coherentism in the way that
Fumerton claims. The two conceptual regresses he poses are problems only for
formulations of a coherence theory of truth that are formulated explicitly using
a foundationalist approach, whereas I have suggested that coherence theories
should more properly adopt a holistic approach.
I doubt that anyone is fully persuaded by my discussion thus far, and may
not likely be persuaded by what I have to say next. Firstly, my arguments have a
distinctly ad hominem flavor, by suggesting that the plausibility of incoherence
arguments is grounded in the failure of imagination of the individual philoso-
phers who offer them. Of course, I have attempted to be careful to phrase my
argument in terms of suspicions and grounds for suspicion, rather than claim-
ing to have demonstrated that incoherence arguments are always faulty or even
incoherent. Yet it might be thought that these kinds of suspicions do not even
represent a proper subject for philosophical discussion.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, none of my criticisms here seem
to extend any farther than effectively pointing out the fallibility of incoherence
arguments. Yes, any given incoherence argument or any other kind of argu-
ment may fail to imagine alternatives that might undermine the argument. The
history of philosophy and science is filled with such cases, and it seems unreason-
able to demand of any philosopher to see beyond the horizon of one’s abilities,
so to speak. All that we philosophers can do is simply to offer arguments as
honestly as possible according to our best available conceptual resources. Our
philosophical descendents will be in a better position to evaluate our arguments,
given their expanded resources.
And to this I agree. In fact, my arguments here may be fallible on precisely
the same grounds that I use to criticize incoherence arguments, as some readers
likely have been eager to point out. Perhaps I have not been able to imagine
a conception of coherence and incoherence beyond those that I have discussed
earlier that would make incoherence arguments decisive. Perhaps I have not
been able to imagine how self-refutation and failure of systematicity can be
deployed to defeat any possible reformulation of the incoherent position. In
short, this discussion is just as fallible as any of the incoherence arguments to
which I direct my suspicion, and therefore should seem equally suspect.
Of course, pointing out that all arguments are fallible does not tend to
increase confidence in any of them, whether in incoherence arguments or my
suspicions against them. What I would point out here, though, is a difference in
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attitude between those who are satisfied with incoherence arguments and those
who may be suspicious of them. If I am satisfied with an incoherence argument,
I will not continue to explore the incoherent position to seek alternatives to
make the position work. After all, if the position is indeed incoherent, then
such exploration would be senseless. If I do continue with the exploration,
then this would suggest that I am not satisfied with the incoherence argument
after all. By contrast, if I am suspicious of the incoherence argument, I would
tend to understand the apparent incoherence as simply posing a problem to
be solved, a problem requiring more philosophical imagination than had been
applied in the incoherence argument itself. The charge of incoherence leveled by
the incoherence argument would thus represent an incentive to further research.
Yet an incoherence argument might still be understood to indicate that the
target of the argument is a conceptual dead end such that further research
might be a waste of time. Why spend valuable time trying to fix an apparently
incoherent position when there are more promising positions available to be
patched up? To the contrary, I suggest that apparently incoherent positions
have a particular instrumental value over putatively more coherent positions,
and this value lies precisely in requiring greater imagination applied to the
solution of the philosophical problems they aim to address, greater imagination
than what is required for more traditional, coherent, and comfortable positions.
I am not the first to make such a suggestion. Fritzman himself, after arguing
for the incoherence of coherence, argues against coherence as a general virtue,
framing his argument in a historical context: “Beliefs which now are incoherent
may be made coherent by the introduction of a new idea, or perspective, which
reconciles or synthesizes them” (Fritzman 1992, p. 188). Furthermore, Fritz-
man cites Paul Feyerabend, who contends notoriously in Against Method that
knowledge does not converge toward some ideal final theory, but represents an
expansion of incompatible competing theories (Feyerabend 2010, pp. 15-16). Of
course there is an uncomfortable tension in Fritzman’s arguments, since if new
ideas can make apparently incoherent beliefs coherent, then Fritzman’s own in-
coherence argument may suffer the same fate, with the result that coherence is
reaffirmed as a virtue. Comparable tensions have been noted with Feyerabend’s
position when applied to itself. So it is at the risk of falling into similar prob-
lems myself that I proceed to argue for the instrumental value of apparently
incoherent positions. I think nevertheless that I can make a good case. I will
frame this discussion against the background of a particular conception of the
nature of philosophy.
The success of science led to what Daniel Wilson calls “a crisis of confi-
dence” (Wilson 1987, p. 235) in philosophy during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, at least in the United States. The issue was whether phi-
losophy should become more like the sciences in its methodologies and in the
specialization of its concerns. Of course, if philosophy and the sciences were to
share methodologies, then it would seem that only the subject matters of the
two disciplines could properly distinguish them, which would raise the ques-
tion of what the proper subject matter of philosophy is or should be. The
traditional broad classification of philosophical subject divides its matters into
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ethics, metaphysics and epistemology. However, if philosophy were to adopt
the methods of the sciences, some of the traditional concerns that fall under
these classifications would need to be abandoned, notably much of metaphysics,
since these concerns could not be addressed by the scientific method. Yet other
conceptions of the subject matter of philosophy have arisen to prominence over
the last century, under the ascendancy of linguistic approaches to philosophy,
such as the conception that philosophy is concerned with a priori or necessary
statements.
I do not share these conceptions of philosophy, and I think that it is some-
what misleading to seek the subject matter of philosophy in contradistinction
to the subject matter of the sciences in the first place. I tend toward a different
conception of philosophy, one grounded in its history or even pre-history, an
older conception held by William James (James 1911, pp. 3-28), among oth-
ers. It might seem that what follows should be accounted more as a mythology
or fairy tale about philosophy, but such mythologies can serve a useful role in
directing and motivating a discipline.
It has been a long time since anyone has called philosophy the queen of the
sciences, at least not with a straight face. The image of philosophy ruling over
the sciences seems ludicrous now, and given the ascendancy of science in modern
society, this demotion in rank and prestige for philosophy would seem to justify
a crisis of confidence. Yet if not queen of the sciences, philosophy is surely
the mother of the sciences, since the early history of philosophy included what
is now recognized as the subject matter of the sciences, as seen most notably
in the work of Aristotle. At one time, the sciences were known as natural
philosophy before becoming functionally independent of philosophy. Psychology
only became independent of philosophy in the late nineteenth century. This
independence again raises the question of what should be the proper relation
of philosophy to the sciences, if indeed philosophy has any role to play beyond
understanding and articulating what science is doing.
I suggest understanding the break of the sciences from philosophy in terms
of the model of specialization within the sciences. As sciences progress, the
increasingly detailed problem sets that need to be solved make it impractical
for individual scientists to work in the whole of science, or even the whole of
a broad field of science such as physics. Therefore physics becomes specialized
as thermodynamics, fluid dynamics, quantum physics, and so forth. This does
not mean that physics itself is nothing more than an aggregate of specializa-
tions, though. The role of physics in general lies in unifying the results of the
specialized branches of physics. Sometimes those results across specializations
are unified quite easily, but other times they raise conflicts or anomalies, which
pose further problem sets in the affected specializations. Insofar as an individual
physicist working in a specialized field seeks to unify those specialized results
with results in other specializations, that physicist practices general physics, in
addition to any primary specializations.
I suggest that philosophy and the sciences can be understood comparably
in terms of specialization. What is the subject matter of philosophy? Since
the sciences and other rational disciplines seem historically to branch off from
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philosophy, I suggest that the subject matter of philosophy is anything subject
to rational inquiry. When a field of philosophy gains sufficient unity in terms
of its methods and range of concerns, it specializes as an independent branch
of study, as a science or other discipline. What is the role of philosophy, then?
It seems that philosophy must study everything not specialized into a separate
science or discipline, as well as unifying that study with the results from the
specialized disciplines, and unifying the results from the specialized disciplines
with each other. Insofar as an individual scientist seeks to unify the results of
a branch of science with disciplines other than science, that scientist engages
his subject as a philosopher, not as a specialized scientist. After all, where
this unifying function extends beyond the sciences, it thereby extends beyond
the methods of the sciences and therefore cannot be considered strictly part of
scientific practice.
This conception of philosophy does not reinstate philosophy as the queen of
the sciences, since science remains autonomous in its specialization. However,
it identifies a function that philosophy serves in relation to the sciences and
other disciplines in terms of unifying and reconciling these disciplines. Yet what
is relevant here to the discussion of apparently incoherent positions is not this
unifying function of philosophy, but rather what remains out of the totality of
what is subject to rational inquiry once the subject matter of the sciences and
other disciplines has been subtracted. I have argued that this remnant falls to
philosophy to study, since other disciplines delineate and restrict their subject
matter and their methods as a result of specialization in order to gain produc-
tivity by focusing on specific problems in specific ways. Philosophy in general
is not subject to such restrictions. Of this remnant that falls to philosophy,
some fields have been fairly clearly defined, such as the traditional philosoph-
ical concerns with ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, and of course these
fields themselves have become further specialized just as individual sciences have
become specialized.
Yet what I would ask here is whether these previously identified philosophic
fields and the scientific and other disciplines together exhaust the totality of
what is subject to rational inquiry? Can one merely enumerate all the known
disciplines and sciences and philosophical fields and claim that all knowledge
falls into one of these categories? Or are there unexplored recesses of the rem-
nants out of the totality of knowledge once these known disciplines are sub-
tracted? If there are unexplored recesses, the sciences and other disciplines will
not discover them, since by definition they fall outside of their delineated subject
matters and methodologies. Therefore, philosophy would seem to be the only
discipline in which these recesses could be explored. Yet insofar as philosophy
itself has delineated particular subject matters such as ethics and epistemology,
focusing strictly on these pre-existing subject matters would seem likewise to
fail to discover any new subject matter.
Here is where I would claim that apparently incoherent positions gain their
instrumental value. Sensible solutions to traditional philosophical problems gain
their sensibility by remaining within comfortable intellectual boundaries. Chal-
lenging solutions test those boundaries. Yet apparently incoherent solutions
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tend to break those boundaries completely. If there is any new intellectual dis-
cipline to be discovered, I propose that it will be discovered by focusing on these
apparently incoherent positions and by attempting to make sense out of appar-
ent nonsense. The rationale behind this proposal derives precisely from my
suspicions concerning incoherence arguments, namely that they seem to repre-
sent a failure to imagine what would be required to make a putatively incoherent
position seem perfectly coherent. The imaginative demands of philosophers re-
searching apparently incoherent positions may need to extend far beyond the
comfortable intellectual boundaries that characterize putatively more sensible
positions, possibly thereby extending into intellectual regions not encompassed
by any existing discipline. In order to explore such regions, new methodologies
would need to be devised, methodologies different from those of any existing
scientific or philosophical discipline. By contrast, by holding to more sensible
positions, a philosopher would likely remain within very comfortable intellectual
boundaries, use methodologies that are already well known, and remain firmly
within the bounds of existing disciplines.
An initial problem may have been framed within an existing field of science
or philosophy, but a solution may require the recognition of a new field alto-
gether, with new ways of thinking and new methodologies. And here is where
I think philosophy stands to gain value with regard to other disciplines. The
philosophical function of unifying disparate branches of knowledge certainly has
an important role to play in the overall scheme of knowledge, but more impor-
tantly, new philosophical ideas have the potential to revolutionize any number
of other disciplines as well as the sciences. Such is the power of good ideas.
Rather than aping the methods of the sciences and envying their success and
prestige, I would suggest that philosophy should recognize its unique position
with regard to knowledge as a whole and aim beyond its current bounds in
search of something radically new. My suggestion is that apparently incoherent
positions represent a unique locus for study whereby the limits of knowledge can
be tested and possibly expanded. Those positions themselves may not turn out
to be feasible in the end, but my proposal is that exploring those positions be-
yond the current bounds of common sense has an instrumental value in enabling
new philosophical ideas and discoveries.
In closing, let me cite one example of an apparently incoherent position that
was later recognized not only as coherent, but as important. The example is
well known and perhaps well worn, but I think it bears repeating in this context.
It comes not from within philosophy, but from mathematics and geometry.
The status of Euclid’s parallel postulate as a postulate had bothered geome-
ters for centuries. Part of what bothered them was that it seemed so incoherent
that two lines should intersect if the interior angles formed by another line
crossing these two were equal to two right angles. If that were so, then it
seemed as though space would either explode hyperbolically or implode ellip-
tically. Because of this seeming incoherence, some geometers thought that the
parallel postulate could be proved as a theorem from the remaining postulates
and axioms of Euclid’s system. Yet in the early nineteenth century, Bolyai and
Lobachevsky published treatises based on a denial of the parallel postulate and
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thereby opened up the field of non-Euclidean geometry. Here, as with my previ-
ous discussion of the conception of coherence as systematicity, the clearest way
to challenge the perception that denying the parallel postulate was incoherent
was to produce a system denying it. The new field of non-Euclidean geometry
became significant enough as a theoretical branch of geometry, but it became
much more important with the application of a non-Euclidean geometry within
relativity physics. What this new field of geometry required was someone with
sufficient imagination to see how an apparently incoherent idea could work after
all.1
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